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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
limited aspect and leaves the grand jury and the court free to indict
and convict on the basis of any constitutional evidence in the posses-
sion of the state.
Since prior cases had established the concept that due process of law
includes the right to freedom from secret trial by the "third degree,"
it therefore may be concluded from the other cases considered, not only
that the federal district court in Refoule v. Ellis was within its consti-
tutional power in making available damages and injunctive remedies
against state police officers, but also that the action "at law or in equity"
given by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 may be extended to include the
suppression of confessions obtained by coercion.
CHARLES W. CORCORAN
The Admissibility of an Accomplice's Confession Against a
Non-confessing Defendant
A rule of evidence recognized by the English Courts as early as 16641
was recently reaffirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, in United States v. Gottfried,2 wherein it was held that
a confession of one of several defendants, on trial jointly, is evidence
only against the person who made it and will not be admitted to affect
adversely others accused of participating in the crime. Judge Learned
Hand, in delivering the opinion of the court, further ruled that it is
not erroneous to admit the confession at the joint trial if a cautionary
instruction is given by the court that it is to be considered only against
the declarant.
Concerning the problem of admissibility of confessions of a co-defend-
ant, the Gottfried case reflects the majority view that the confession is
receivable only against the confessor.3 This view is a derivative of the
hearsay rule which dictates that only if the confessor reiterates his ac-
cusatory statement in court, and thus is subject to cross-examination,
can it be admitted against his accomplice. The rule is also supported
by the theory that the mere testimony of accomplices should not be of
sufficient weight to convict an accused, since the temptation for self-
absolution by means of perjury is too great to permit such a statement
to be regarded seriously.4
tion issued against further arrests, indictments or prosecutions, on ground that
where federal rights were shown, they were paramount to state laws and policy,
and that plaintiff need not sustain damage by waiting -to simply defend himself
in the state prosecutions); Alesna v. Rice, 69 F. Supp. 897 (D.C. Hawaii 1947)
(injunction issued against criminal contempt prosecution), case cited note 31 supra;
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (enforcement of penal provisions of railroad
rate statute enjoined where unconstitutional deprivation of property was threatened).
1 Tong's Case, Kelyng 18 (1664).
2 165 F. (2d) 360 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
3 Madigan v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 180 (C.C.A. 8th, 1927); State v. Gargano,
99 Conn. 103, 121 A. 657 (1923) (confession made by a plea of guilty not admissible
against a co-defendant) ; Blanco v. State, 150 Fla. 98, 7 So. (2d) 333 (1942); Comm
v. Epps, 298 Pa. 377, 148 A. 523 (1930).
4 The scope of this article does not include a discussion of confessions made in the
prosecution of the common enterprise and during its existence. However, some modifi-
cations of the general rule are to be noted in the following cases: State v. Williams,
62 Wash. 288, 113 Pac. 780 (1911) (held that the admissions or confessions of a
defendant could be admitted in evidence against a co-defendant in order to prove
the plan or conspiracy to commit the crime charged). This rule was reviewed and
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Chief among the exceptions to this rule is found where the co-defend-
ant acknowledges the confession, in which case the confession becomes
admissible, not as evidence or statements of his accomplices, but as his
own statement of facts. This may be done by voluntary affirmance,5 or
under some conditions by silence as an admission of acquiescence. 6 A
defendant will be deemed to have assented to his co-defendant's con-
fession, by his silence, when it is read in his presence under conditions
and circumstances which would normally bring forth a denial from an
innocent person and he makes no reply or otherwise fails to deny.
7
However, if the confession of the accomplice is referred to the defendant
under circumstances such that he is in no position to deny it, or if his
silence is of such character that it does not justify the inference that
he should have spoken, or if in any way he is restrained from speaking,
either by fear, doubt of his rights, instructions given him by his attor-
ney, or'a reasonable belief that it would be better or safer for him if
he kept silent, the statement itself and the fact that the accused kept
silent are not admissible in evidence against him.8 Many jurisdictions
go further and do not recognize the principle of assent by silence when
in custody, some holding that it must be assumed that the maintenance
of silence is the best strategic policy for one accused of crime,9 others
supporting exclusion of evidence of silent assent with the argument
that if, when under arrest, the mere silence of the defendant should be
held to constitute evidence of his guilt, he would actually be compelled
to enter into a discussion of his innocence or guilt and thus his consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination would be violated.10
discarded in State v. Goodwin, 186 P. (2d) 935 (Wash., 1947), as it in effect resulted
in allowing confessions of a co-defendant to be admitted for all purposes. See also
State v. Meyers, 198 Mo. 225, 94 S.W. 242 (1906) (when counsel for defendant, on
cross examination of an accomplice who had been convicted, read to the accomplice
portions of his alleged confession the court then allowed the state to read the entire
confession, including portions damaging to defendant); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St.
457, 21 N.E. 476 (1889) (admissible when a prima facie case of conspiracy has been
made); Scrivener v. State, 32 Ohio App. 433, 168 N.E. 142 (1929) (confession
admitted when made by two defendants against all jointly where the conspiracy had
been clearly established).
5 Allen v. State, 49 Okl. Crim. 195, 293 Pae. 271 (1930); Comm. v.. Oreszak, 328 Pa.
65, 195 A. 45 (1937); Comm. v. Wood, 142 Pa. Super. 340, 16 A. (2d) 319 (1940);
4 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 117. "There may also be a joint confession
where two or more participants after answering questions at an interview, unite in
signing, or otherwise adopting, a single document in which case the statements are
admissible against all."
6 Clark v. State, 240 Ala. 65, 197 So. 23 (1940) ; People v. Bringhurst, 192 Cal. 748,
221 Pac. 897 (1923).
7 Edwards v. State, 155 Fla. 550, 20 So. (2d) 916 (1945); People v. Lehne, 359 Ill.
631, 195 N.E. 468 (1935); Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2d ed.
1948) 181.
8 People v. Hanley, 317 Ill. 39, 147 N.E. 400 (1925); People v. Koslowski, 368
Ill. 124, 13 N.E. (2d) 174 (1938); People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356, 93 N.E. 943
(1911) (under instruction given by his attorney). In Anderson c. State, 197 Ark. 600,
124 S.W. (2d) 216 (1939), the court applied to confessions of a co-defendant the rule
concernihg the requisites to admissibility of admissions set forth in Meriwether v.
Comm., 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904). These requisites are that the person to be
bound by the statement heard it, understood it, had an opportunity to express himself
concerning it, and was called upon to act upon or reply to it.
9 Comm. v. McDermott, 123 Mass. 440, 25 Am. Rep. 120 (1877) (declared the
"Massachusetts view" that co-defendant is not called upon to contradict statements
prejudicial to him); People v. Dolce, 261 N.Y. 108, 184 N.E. 690 (1933).
10 U.S. Const. Amend. 5 "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ... "; Johnson v. State, 151 Ga. 21, 105 S.E. 603 (1921)
Ellis v. State, 8 Okl. Crim. 522, 128 Pac. 1095 (1913).
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The reasons for admitting the confession in the joint trial are clear.
It should be admissible against the confessor just as any competent
evidence tending to prove his guilt. The mere fact that the evidence
is a confession, subsequently repudiated by the confessor, is not suffi-
cient to change this principle even though the confession may tend to
implicate a co-defendant. 11 If the court determines that the confession
is to be admitted against the non-confessing defendant, his guilt must
nevertheless be clearly established by independent evidence. 12 If it is
determined that the confession shall not be used in evidence against
the non-confessing defendant as was determined in the Gottfried case,
the problem of how the confession can be admitted against the confessor
and yet not prejudice the rights of his co-defendant then arises. This
is the precise problem which is here treated.
The most obvious means of precluding prejudice would be to grant a
separate trial to those defendants who have not confessed. Yet the
right to a severance must rest upon the ground that the defense to be
offered by one of the defendants is so antagonistic to the defense to be
offered by the remaining defendants, that severance is necessary to
insure a fair trial.13 Generally all defendants who are jointly indicted
should be tried jointly and the matter of granting a separate trial rests
within the sound discretion of the court and cannot be assigned as error
in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.14 It is not, in most cases,
an abuse of discretion to refuse severance when it is known that a
confession in writing made by one of the defendants, implicating the
others, will probably be introduced at the trial.15 However a small
minority of courts have held that a severance should be ordered when
there is no evidence, other than the accomplice's confession, connecting
the defendant with the crime, unless the State's Attorney declares that
the confession will not be offered in evidence, or unless there be elimi-
nated from the confession any reference to the non-confessing defend-
ant. 16 This latter rule, which demands that greater deference be paid
the rights of the non-confessing joint indictee by requiring trial court
scrutiny of the nature and scope of the evidence to be presented by
the state in addition to the confession, seems highly desirable.
11 Randazzo v. United States, 300 F. 794 (C.C.A. 8th 1929); State v. Fox, 133
Ohio St. 154, 12 N.E. 413 (1938).
12 Markley v. State, 173 Md. 304, 196 A. 95 (1938) ; People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419,
164 N.E. 336 (1928).
13 People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935).
14 Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 433 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938) (severance in the
Federal courts is not a right but rests in the court's discretion) ; Cantaneo v. United
States, 167 F. (2d) 820 (C.C.A. 4th, 1948); Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rules 8(b), 14, 18 U.S.C.A. following §687.
1' Accord: People v. King, 30 Cal. App. (2d) 185, 85 P. (2d) 928 (1938); Comm.
v. Borasky, 214 Mass. 313, 101 N.E. 377 (1913); State v. Guerzon, 23 Wash. (2d)
242, 160 P. (2d) 603 (1945). Contra: Flamme v. State, 170 Wis. 501, 177 N.W. 596
(1920) (in charge of adultery the confession of one defendant must inevitably
operate to the prejudice of the other defendant's rights).
16 People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930) ; People v. Bolton, 339 Ill.
229, 171 N.E. 152 (1930) ; People v. Serritello, 385 Ill. 554, 53 N.E. (2d) 581 (1944)
(reversed because there was little evidence other than co-defendant's confession con-
necting defendant with the crime); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E. (2d) 692
(1946) (reversed because co-defendant's confessions were highly important in con-
tributing to conviction). Cf. People v. Feolo, 282 N.Y. 276, 26 N.E. (2d) 256 (1940)
(denial of severance was error where it appeared that without the confession of one




If severance is denied and thus a joint trial becomes necessary, it is im-
perative to look to the less effective means of insuring that the co-
defendant's confession will be considered only against himself. When
this problem first arose in England, the courts held that the names of
other co-indictees mentioned in a confession used and read against the
party making it were to be omitted.17 Although the courts of the United
States have not favored this remedy, there are decisions to that effect.'8
This rule is objected to as not being sufficient in most instances, the
inference created by the omission of names in the text being too clear
to the jury to be mistaken.
A few courts have gone a step further and held that where part of
a confession of one defendant, affecting another defendant, was readily
separable and unnecessary to completeness of the confession or admission
as to the defendant who made it, expunging of parts which implicated
another defendant was permissible.19 However this remedy is objection-
able in a jurisdiction requiring a statement to be introduced in its
entirety.20
The most widely accepted of these means of precluding prejudice to
the co-defendant, and the one adopted in the Gottfried case, is the
admission of the confession of the accomplice with instructions to the
jury to consider it only against the declarant. 21 It is presumed that
the jury will follow the court's instructions and thus any prejudicial
effect which the admission of the confession might reflect on the non-
confessing defendant is thought to be obviated. However it seems
apparent to many that this is pure fiction and that actually the jury
will not and cannot eliminate the effect of the evidence from their
minds entirely, and thus the usual result of the device is to admit other-
wise objectionable hearsay evidence.22  Judge Hand, in the Gottfried
case, seems to recognize this weakness. After commenting that as a
practical result the cautionary instruction is not effective, he rationalizes
his position in stating that "hearsay is admissible in all sorts of situa-
tions when the truth is not otherwise available and the fact that this
may be another exception is not conclusive against it. . . . In effect
the rule probably furthers rather than impedes the search for truth
and thus perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it vio-
lates substance."
When the trial judge allows a highly incriminating statement made
by a joint indictee to come before the jury, no matter how technically
restricted the purpose, it in substance denies the non-confessing defend-
17 4 Wigmore, Evidence op. dt. &upra note 5 at p. 496.
18 People v. Betsoh, 362 Ill. 502, 200 N.E. 594 (1936) (co-defendant's name deleted
and words " other person" substituted) ; People v. Meisenhelter, 381 Ill. 378, 45 N.E.
(2d) 678 (1943) (court substituted the words "other person or persons" and also
gave a cautionary instruction to the jury).
19 Comm. v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E. (2d) 189 (1936) ; State v. Boswell,
56 A. (2d) 196 (R.I. 1947) (defendant lost this opportunity by not moving to delete
prejudicial matter) ; Miller v. People, 98 Colo. 249, 55 P. (2d) 320 (1936) (part of
co-defendant's confession implicating the defendant excluded).
20 State v. Livsey, 190 La. 474, 182 So. 576 (1938).
21 Skikowski v. United States, 158 F. (2d) 177 (App. D.C. 1946); State v. Sanchez,
59 Ariz. 426, 129 P. (2d) 923 (1942); Blanco v. State, 150 Fla. 98, 7 So. (2d) 333
(1942) ; State v. Clapp, 94 N.H. 62, 46 A. (2d) 119 (1946) ; Comm. v. Dolan, 155 Pa.
Super. 453, 38 A. (2d) 497 (1944).
22 People v. Sweetin, 325 Ill. 245, 156 N.E. 354 (1927) (remarks that it is prac-
tically impossible to remove by instruction the prejudicial effect of the confession).
See Nash v. U.S., 54 F. (2d) 1006 (C.C.A. 8th, 1932).
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ant one of the elemental rights comprised within the concept of fair
trial, namely, the right of confrontation of his accuser. This is so be-
cause the confession will normally have been obtained without the
presence of the co-defendant, and the confessing defendant cannot be
subjected to cross-examination at the trial. By hypothesis the confessor
no longer claims the confession as his own. Thus the majority rule, in
denying a severance without requiring a careful preliminary inquiry
on the question of the possible weight the jury may improperly attach
to the confession as to the guilt of the non-confessing defendant, places
speed and economy in the administration of justice above the funda-
mental fairness which a separate trial would insure.23
The minority rule disallowing severance only when there appears to
be sufficiently strong evidence against the defendant, independent of his
co-defendant's confession, would seem to be the more equitable approach.
By using a little foresight, the trial judge could base his decision or.
motion for severance on an estimate of the probable facts in issue. Thus,
if identity were contested and the prosecutor admitted having only
weak circumstantial proof thereon, and if the confession tended to
throw light on this particular issue, a severance should be granted.
While this approach requires a review by the trial judge of the prose-
cution's proposed proof, it would seem to present the only intelligent
compromise between the competing considerations of efficiency in the
administration of criminal justice and fundamental fairness to the
accused.
JOE W. McCLARA_
23 See dissent of Lehman, J. in People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E. 336 (1928).
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